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THE EFFECT OF THE TRUST RECEIPTS ACT
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT*T HE adoption of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act by New York'
in 1934 and by Illinois,'2 Indiana s and Oregon4 in 1935 makes
pertinent a discussion of the effect of this statute on the law of
lender and borrower and sales financing.
The act was prepared for the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws by Professor Karl N. Llewellyn of the Columbia
University Law School during the years 1925 to 1933. Its growth can be
traced and its theories discovered by an examination of the annual hand-
books of the Conference during that period.5
That the statute is difficult to understand is shown by the memorandum
of Governor Homer of Illinois which he filed with the Secretary of State
when he permitted the bill to become law last July without his signature.
The Governor said:
This law .... is a very complicated and technical act, the purposes of which are
not readily discernible. It consists of a number of innovations to our credit system
affecting the manner of operation of conditional sales, trust receipt contracts and ware-
house receipts as pledges to secure credits. In view of the complicated nature of the
Bill and the short time I have at my disposal for the consideration of the same, I am
impelled to rely upon the legislative judgment, and I am therefore constrained to file
the same without my signature.
The commercial practice, law and theory relating to trust receipts prior
to the Uniform Act have been discussed in many texts and law review ar-
ticles.6
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
'Laws 1934, C. 574, now Personal Property Law, §§ So-58L.
2 Ill. R. S. i935, c. i4oa, §§ 13-34, in effect July 12, 1935. The Illinois Act differs from the
Uniform Act as approved by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the American Bar As-
sociation in several material respects. These changes are noted throughout this article.
3 Ind. Laws 1935, C. 206. 4 Ore. Laws 1935, c. 224.
5 Handbook Nat. Conf. Com'rs on Uniform State Laws (1925), p. 594; id. (1926), 399;
id. (1927), p. 607; id. (1928), p. 35; id. (1929), p. 205; id. (1930), p. 267; id. (1931), p. 296;
id. (1932), p. 205; id. (i933), p. 241.
6 For discussions of the common law and early history of trust receipts, see Frederick, The
Trust Receipt as Security, 22 Col. L. Rev. 395, 546 (1922); Taylor, Trust Receipts, 6 Cornell
L. Q. x68 (1921); Hanna, Trust Receipts, 29 Col. L. Rev. 545 (1929), x9 Calif. L. Rev. 257
(1929); Vold, Trust Receipt Security in Financing of Sales, iS Cornell L. Q. 543 (1930); 1 Wil-
liston, Sales, §§ 338a-338b, 437 (2d ed. 1924); Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales
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EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT
No attempt is here made to treat the minute details of the Act. The
effort is rather to give a broad, general view of its purposes. It may per-
haps be most profitably studied and compared with the common law under
the following heads:
I. What is a trust receipt transaction?
II. Its validity against creditors.
III. Its validity against purchasers.
IV. Filing provisions.
V. Enforcement of the trust receipt.
VI. Pledges affected by the act.
VII. Summary.
I. WHAT IS A TRUST RECEIPT TRANSACTION UINDER THE ACT?
A. Types of property covered by a trust receipt
The property covered by a trust receipt transaction under the Act must
belong to one or more of the following three classes, namely: 7
(I) "Goods" (e.g., machinery, grain).
(2) "Documents" (e.g., bills of lading or warehouse receipts represent-
ing goods).
(3) "Instruments" (e.g., bonds, stock certificates, notes).
B. Parties to trust receipt must be lender and borrower
The two necessary parties to the trust receipt transaction (called in the
act "entruster" and "trustee") must occupy the relation of lender and
borrower toward each other. The word "trustee" is used in the act in an
artificial sense,8 and does not connote a true equity trustee.9 The trust
receipt does not involve a strict trust or other fiduciary relation."°
C. What lenders and borrowers may be parties to a trust receipt?
But it is only particular lenders and borrowers who may be parties to
the trust receipt transaction. The lender must fall into one of the follow-
ing classes:"'
§ 12 (1924). Student notes on the Uniform Trust Receipts Act are found in 4 Brooklyn L. Rev.
100 (1934); 4 Fordham L. Rev. io8 (i935); 9 St. Johns L. Rev. 250 (i934); 82 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 270 (i934); 2o Va. L. Rev. 689 (1934).
7 Uniform Act, §§ i, 2; Illinois Act, § 13, 14.
*Uniform Act, §r (i4); Illinois Act, § 13 (14).
9 As to the distinctions between a strict trust and a trust receipt see Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 38 (1935).
-0 Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (934), noted in 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 475
U2935).
xxUniform Act, § 2; Illinois Act, § 14.
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(i) An old creditor who delivers to his debtor as "trustee" goods, docu-
ments or instruments in which he (the old creditor) already has a security
interest, wipes out the old security interest and takes in place thereof a
trust receipt security interest in the same subject matter.
Illustration.-A is in possession of jewelry as a pledgee from B to secure
a loan previously made from A to B. A releases B from the pledge, de-
livers the jewelry to B, and in place of the pledge takes from B a trust
receipt on the jewelry. The transaction is a valid trust receipt transaction
under the act.X2
(2) A new 3 creditor who delivers goods, documents, or instruments to
his borrower in return for a security interest therein under a trust receipt.
Illustratio.-Iides are sold by A in the Argentine to B in Chicago, the
bill of lading for them being made out to C (a Chicago bank) which has
issued a letter of credit for B in favor of A and paid drafts drawn by A on
C for the price of the hides. C delivers the bill of lading to B in order that
B may sell the hides and get money to pay C, and C takes a trust receipt
on the hides from B. The transaction is a valid trust receipt transaction
under the act.
(3) A new creditor contracts for a security interest by way of trust
receipt in documents or instruments exhibited by the borrower to the lend-
er at the place of business of either, before the transaction is completed,
but possession of the documents or instruments is retained by the borrower.
Illustration.-A (a banker) lends money to B on the understanding
that he (A) is to have a trust receipt security interest in a share of stock
belonging to B as general owner, the stock certificate for which is shown
by B to A in the A bank before the loan but is thereafter left with B for
one of the purposes hereafter described. The transaction is a valid trust
receipt transaction under the act.
(4) A new creditor lends money in reliance on getting a security in-
terest by way of trust receipt in goods or documents then in the possession
of the borrower. 4
Illustration.-The A bank lends B money in reliance on getting a trust
receipt security interest in automobiles then in B's possession and gen-
12 Uniform Act, § 14 (Illinois Act, § 26) provides: "As against purchasers and creditors, the
entruster's security interest may extend to any obligation for which the goods, documents or
instruments were security before the trust receipt transaction, and to any new value given or
agreed to be given as a part of such transaction; but not, otherwise, to secure past indebtedness
of the trustee; nor shall the obligation secured under any trust receipt transaction extend to
obligations of the trustee to be subsequently created."
'3 The Illinois Act includes renewals and extensions of time as giving "new value," although
the Uniform Act does not. Illinois Act, § 13(7); Uniform Act, § 1(7).
14 This provision is peculiar to the Illinois Act.
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erally owned by B, and the bank leaves the automobiles in B's possession
for one of the authorized purposes later defined. The transaction is a valid
trust receipt transaction under the act.
The act thus permits the security interest under the trust receipt to
come to the lender in either of the following ways:
(a) In substitution for an existing security interest which he has; or
(b) From a third party (like the seller of goods to the borrower); or
(c) Direct from the borrower.
The statute requires the lender's acts to be performed in return for a
written trust receipt or a promise to give a written trust receipt.'5
The debt to be secured by the trust receipt may be a new debt or some
types of old debts, but not a future debt. 6
The lender ("entruster") under a trust receipt within the act cannot be
one who, at the beginning of the transaction, was a general owner of, and
dealer in, the goods or instruments, and who sells them to the borrower
("trustee") on credit, and retains security by way of conditional sale or
chattel mortgage. 7 The act is intended to be without effect on the pre-
existing law of conditional sales and chattel mortgages. Nor may the
lender under the act be a consignor of goods who places them with a con-
signee for sale as agent.,' The law of consignor and consignee is not intend-
ed to be affected by the act.
These rules as to the required character of the lender and borrower ex-
tend the trust receipt to some new cases which had not generally been held
to be covered by that phrase at common law, namely, cases (i) and (3)
above. The typical trust receipt case at common law was case (2) above.
As to case (4) there was doubt, some courts 9 requiring the security title to
pass to the lender from a third party, not the borrower; that is, requiring
the trust receipt transaction to be a three party transaction, normally
that of seller, buyer and bank finandng the buyer. The act extends the
use of the trust receipt to many two party transactions.
D. Requirements as to possession of goods, documents or instruments
As shown above, under the act ° a trust receipt transaction cannot exist
without possession of the goods, documents, or instruments which are
to be its subject matter either
is Uniform Act, § 2(I)(b)(I) and (11); Illinois Act, § x4(x)(b)(I) and (II).
'
6Uniform Act, § 14; Illinois Act, § 26. t
'7 Uniform Act, § 1(3); Illinois Act, § z3(3).
Z Uniform Act, § i; Illinois Act, § 27.
"g See, for example, In re A. E. Fountain Co., Inc., 282 Fed. 816 (C.C.A. 2d 1922); Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Callahan, 271 Mass. 556, 171 N., 82o (i93o).
2o Uniform Act, § 2; Illinois Act, § 14.
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(i) Remaining in the borrower as a result of the transaction; or
(2) Passing to the borrower as a result of the transaction.
E. Requirements as to purpose for which possession is retained or obtained
by borrower
Not only must the lender and borrower be of a particular type, and not
only must the lender permit the borrower to retain or get possession, but
that possession must be kept or obtained for one or more of a limited num-
ber of purposes, if the transaction is to be a trust receipt transaction under
the act.2 ' The purpose must be one of the following:
(i) In order to enable the borrower to sell or exchange goods, docu-
ments or instruments entrusted.
Illustratio.-A finance company permits B to get possession of auto-
mobiles and put them in his show room for sale, the company taking a
trust receipt on the automobiles. The purpose is proper.
(2) In order to enable the borrower to process or handle the goods en-
trusted, or the goods represented by the document entrusted, preparatory
to sale by the borrower.
Ilustration.-A bank, having advanced the price of hides, on behalf of
a buyer, delivers to him the bill of lading for the goods in order that he
may have the hides tanned and sold; and the bank takes a trust receipt on
the hides. The purpose is proper.
(3) In order that instruments delivered to, or retained by, the borrower
may be (a) delivered to a principal of the borrower; or (b) delivered to a
depositary or registrar; or (c) used for presentation, collection or renewal.
Illustration.-A bank lending money to B has exhibited to it at the bank
a note owned by B, and lends in reliance thereon to B, getting-from B a
trust receipt security interest in the note. It permits B to keep the note
in order that he may collect it from the maker. The purpose is proper.
By section 4 of the Uniform Act2 2 a contract to give a trust receipt has
the same legal effect as a trust receipt with reference to goods, documents
or instruments thereafter delivered to the borrower in reliance on such
contract, or (under the Illinois Act) with reference to goods, documents or
instruments in the hands of the borrower and which are the source of a
security interest given in return for new value.23
21 Uniform Act, § 2(3); Illinois Act, § 14(3).
- Uniform Act, § i6; Illinois Act, § 16.
2" This last clause is peculiar to the Illinois Act, § i6.
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II. VALIDITY OF A TRUST RECEIPT AGAINST
CREDITORS OF THE BORROWER
As between borrower and lender all terms of the trust receipt are valid,
except that a waiver by the borrower of his equities under the receipt is
invalid24 on analogy to the rules with regard to the clauses in mortgages
waiving the equity of redemptions and in conditional sales waiving statu-
tory protection of equities.2
6
The fundamental purpose of the trust receipt is to afford lenders short
term protection against the honest insolvency of their borrowers. It was,
therefore, accepted at common law that the trust receipt was valid against
the creditors of the borrower, whether lien or general, and whether acting
for themselves or through a representative like a trustee in bankruptcy27
A. Validity against creditors continued in qualified manner
The act continues this validity against creditors of the borrower in
large part, but somewhat qualifies it.2 8 The lender is protected in his se-
curity interest in the subject matter against the creditors of the borrower
to the following extent:
(I) For thirty days without filing.
(2) After thirty days the trust receipt is invalid against lien creditors of
the borrower who have acquired a lien on the goods without actual notice
of the trust receipt, if (a) the trust receipt was not filed, or (b) the lender
had not taken possession of the subject matter before the acquisition of
the lien by the creditor.
(3) The borrower's assignee for creditors, receiver or trustee in bank-
ruptcy is a lien creditor without notice under the act if any of the creditors
whom he represents did not have notice of the trust receipt before the
representative of creditors was appointed.29
(4) Filing (as later described) makes the trust receipt valid against all
creditors of the borrower from the time of filing.
24Uniform Act, § 5; Illinois Act, § 17.
25 See 2 Jones, Mortgages § 1326 (8th ed. 1928).
26 See Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales §§ 135-142 (1924).
27 Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C.C.A. 3d 1912); In re Bell Motor Co.,
45 F. (2d) 19 (C.C.A. 8th 1930); Houck v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 44 F. (2d) 410
(D.C. Pa. 1930); In re James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (C.C.A. 2d 1929); Peoples' National Bank v.
Mulholland, 224 Mass. 448, 113 N.E. 365 (1916); ib. 228 Mass. 152, 117 N.E. 46 (1917).
28 Uniform Act, § 8; Illinois Act, § 20.
29 The Illinois Act omits a provision of the Uniform Act, § 8(2)(a), making a creditor who
procures the issuance of process a lien creditor, from the time of issuance, if he attaches or
levies within a reasonable time thereafter. (Illinois Act; § 8(2).)
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(5) Taking possession3° of the subject matter by the lender makes the
trust receipt valid against all creditors of the borrower from that time
forth.
(6) Creditors of the borrower who acquired their claims by processing,
transporting or warehousing the goods held under the trust receipt, and
get liens thereby, are superior to the lender to the extent of their liens,
regardless of filing."
Illustration.-A bank entrusts cotton to a borrower in order to have it
ginned and sold. The borrower has it ginned and warehoused and the
state law gives ginners and warehousemen liens. These liens are superior
to the trust receipt security rights of the bank, even though the bank had
previously filed in accordance with the act.
Ill. VALIDITY OF THE TRUST RECEIPT AGAINST
PURCHASERS FROM BORROWER
Since a cardinal object of the trust receipt transaction is ordinarily to
enable the borrower to sell the goods in order to raise money to pay the
lender, it has been generally held at common law that the lender could not
assert any rights against the purchaser from the borrower in the usual
case.3 2 The lender has given an express or implied power of sale by which
he should be bound.
The act in general continues this protection of the purchaser and also
provides rules regarding other types of transfer.3 3 The situation under the
act may be indicated by the following outline:
A. Negotiable documents and instruments
(i) If the borrower negotiates a negotiable document or instrument to
a bona fide purchaser or holder in due course the latter acquires good title
against the lender.34
30 Uniform Act, § 1(9), Illinois Act, § 13(9) provides: "'Possession,' as used in this Act
with reference to possession taken or retained by the entiuster, means actual possession of
goods, documents or instruments, or in. the case of goods, such constructive possession as, by
means of tags or signs or other outward marks placed and remaining in conspicuous places,
may reasonably be expected in fact to indicate to the third party in question that the entruster
has control over or interest in the goods."
31 § ixi. For a contrary view at common law, see Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed.
252 (C.C.A. 3d 1912).
32 Glass v. Continental Guar. Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921); Handy v. C.I.T. Corp.,
197 N.E. 64 (Mass. 1935).
33 Uniform Act, § 9; Illinois Act, § 21.
34 It was so held in Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, zoo N.E. 1025 (I913),
with regard to negotiable bills of lading; and in Commercial National Bank of New Orleans v.
Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520 (1916), and in In re Richheimer, 221 Fed. 16
(C.C.A. 7 th I915), with regard to negotiable warehouse receipts.,
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(2) Filing under the act is not constructive notice to a purchaser of a
negotiable document or instrument.
(3) The entrusting of a document or instrument includes the case of a
document or instrument substituted for the one originally entrusted, and
a document or instrument representing the same goods as those represent-
ed by the document originally entrusted.3s
B. Non-negotiable instruments and documents; and goods
(i) A purchaser in the ordinary course of business from the borrower
gets title free of the trust receipt, if the borrower had an unlimited power
of sale, regardless of filing.
Illustration.-A finance company entrusting automobiles to a dealer for
sale under a trust receipt files the notice later described under the act,
and thereafter B, as a regular customer of the dealer, purchases an auto-
mobile from the dealer either with or without knowledge of the filing and
relationship between the company and the dealer. B gets perfect title.
(2) A purchaser in the ordinary course of business from the borrower
gets title free of the trust receipt, even though the sale was in violation
of the limitations on the borrower's authority to sell, unless the purchaser
had actual knowledge of such limitations.31
Illustration.-Same as last illustration, except that the dealer is au-
thorized to sell for cash only. The filing does not bind B and unless he
had actual knowledge of the limitation on the dealer's power of sale, he
gets perfect title, even though he bought on credit.
(3) A purchaser out of the ordinary course of business (including a
chattel mortgagee,3 7 a pledgee,38 and a buyer in bulk from the borrower)
takes subject to the trust receipt regardless of filing or its lack, except
(a) where a pledgee or mortgagee gives new value to the lender as mort-
3s This follows the view of the supreme Court in Commercial National Bank of New Or-
leans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520 (i916), and the opinion in In re
Richheimer, 221 Fed. i6 (C.C.A. 7th 1915).
36 In accord with this provision, see Handy v. C.I.T. Corp., 197 N.E. 64 (Mass. 1935),
where an automobile was put into the hands of a dealer to sell but no sale was to occur without
written consent of the finance company, and it was held that a bonafide purchaser in the ordi-
nary course from the dealer without the written consent of the finance company was protected.
37 In Peoples' Loan & Inv. Co. v. Universal Credit Co., 75 F. (2d) 545 (C.C.A. 8th x935),
it was held that a trust receipt was valid against the taker of a second trust receipt from the
borrower in possession, the latter transaction being in all probability equivalent to an attempt-
ed chattel mortgage.
31 This is contrary in effect to International Trust Co. v. Webster National Bank, 258 Mass.
17, 154 N.E. 330 (1926), and Osgood Bradley Co. v. Standard Co., 259 Mass. 302, 156 N.E. 44o
(1927), where bona fide pledgees from the borrower in possession were protected against the
trust receipt on the ground that the borrower was a "factor" under the Massachusetts Fac-
tor's Act.
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gagor or pledgor within thirty days after the giving of the trust receipt
and gets possession of the goods, documents or instruments before the
filing of the trust receipt, or (b) the pledgee, mortgagee or buyer in bulk
gives value after the thirty day period and gets possession before the trust
receipt filing.
(4) Putting or keeping goods in a stock or show room of the lender, or
permitting such conduct, has the legal effect of conferring a power of sale
on him.
(5) A purchaser on credit from the borrower is a purchaser for value.
IV. FILING UNDER THE ACT
Filing of the trust receipt under the act is accomplished not by filing an
individual trust receipt or copy thereof, but by filing with the Secretary
of State a statement signed by lender and borrower, giving their addresses,
to the effect that they intend to do business on the trust receipt plan with
regard to a particular type of goods. The validity of the filing continues
for one year, when refiling is permitted. Filing is allowed only as to trust
receipts dealing with goods and documents and not as to transactions with
regard to instruments. 39
Prior to the act in most jurisdictions there was no provision for filing a
trust receipt and it was valid without filing or recording. Occasionally,
however, the trust receipt was regarded as equivalent to a conditional
sale4° or a chattel mortgage4' and required to conform to the filing or re-
cording statutes applying to those transactions. In Illinois a federal de-
cision42 construed a trust receipt to be equivalent to a conditional sale and
so at that time invalid except between the parties and against third par-
ties with notice. Since the validation of conditional sales in Illinois in
1925 by the construction of the Uniform Sales Act in the Sherer-Gillet
case, 43 the conditional sale has been good against all persons (before de-
fault) without recording 44 or filing, and the trust receipt has presumably
been valid as one type of conditional sale; but the Uniform Trust Receipts
39 Uniform Act, § 13; Illinois Act, § 25.
40 In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (C.C.A. 6th 1918); Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Schneider, 202 Ia. 938, 211 N.W. 248 (1926); White v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
2 F. Supp. 406 (D.C. Ky. 1932).
41 Motor Bankers' Corp. v. C.I.T. Corp., 258 Mich. 302, 241 N.W. 9ii (1932).
4In re Richheimer, 221 Fed. i6 (C.C.A. 7th 1915), cert. den. 238 U.S. 624 (114).
43 Sherer-Gillet Co. v. Long, 318 I1. 432, 149 N.E. 225 (1925).
44 The lack of a recording or filing statute in Illinois as to conditional sales may permit a
lender to get security without any publicity. He can take a bill of sale from his borrower and give
back to the borrower a conditional sales contract. Will lenders in Illinois from now on resort
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Act has changed this situation by treating the trust receipt transaction as
an independent dealing, distinct from the conditional sale.
In Ohio a statute of 1925 permitted filing of notices 45 with regard to
trust receipts of "readily marketable staples." A recent Connecticut stat-
ute also deals with the same matter.46
V. ENFORCEMENT OF TRUST IECEIPTS UNDER TEE ACT
A. Taking possession of goods, documents or instruments; sale
If the borrower defaults in paying the lender the amount loaned, for
which the trust receipt is security, the lender may take possession of the
subject-matter of the trust receipt and sell it on five days notice, the pro-
ceeds to be applied on the debt and expenses, any surplus fo go to the
borrower and any deficiency to be paid by the borrower.47
The lender having taken possession need not sell, but may keep the
goods and then be subject to the duties of a pledgee regarding them.
In the case of goods manufactured by style or model the lender may
provide in the trust receipt for a right to apply the value of the goods re-
taken against the borrower's debt without a sale.
The borrower may, after default, surrender his interest in the goods to
the lender, but may not contract in the trust receipt for a waiver or for-
feiture of his equities.
A bona fide purchaser from the lender in possession gets good title, even
though the possession by the lender may have been wrongful.
B. Proceeds of goods, documents or instruments in hands of borrower or others
(i) If the subject matter of the trust receipt has been sold by the bor-
rower under a power of sale, and the borrower defaults, the lender is en-
titled to the debt from the purchaser to the borrower plus any security
given as an incident thereto, subject to any equities in favor of the pur-
chaser and against the borrower which accrued before the purchaser had
actual notice of the trust receipt.
Illustration.-A bank has put a borrower into possession of goods to
sell. The borrower sells them to X, taking a note of X for the price and a
chattel mortgage by X on other goods. The borrower defaults in his duty
to the secret, rather roundabout security of the conditional sale in order to avoid possible
filing and foreclosure complications under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act? The need for the
adoption in Illinois of a conditional sales filing statute is increasingly apparent.
4sLaws 1925, p. xx6.
46 Conn. Laws 193,5, c. 23o, Gen. Stat. § i574c.
47 Recovery of a deficiency after retaking and sale by the lender was approved in Charavay
& Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 81g (C.C. N.Y. rgo9).
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to pay the bank. The bank may take the note of X and the chattel mort-
gage in order to protect itself under the trust receipt.
(2) If the subject matter was sold by the borrower when there was no
power of sale, the lender is entitled, if the borrower defaults, to the debt
against the purchaser and to the proceeds of the subject matter received
by the borrower (or the value of such proceeds), if they were received by
him within ten days of his receivership or bankruptcy.
Illustration.-Same as case next above, except that borrower had no
power of sale and took as payment cash, and went into bankruptcy within
ten days. The lender is entitled to a preference out of the bankrupt estate
to the amount of the cash thus received.
(3) If the subject matter was sold under a power of sale in the bor-
rower, where there was a duty to account to the lender for the proceeds of
such sale,4 the lender is entitled, if the borrower defaults in his obliga-
tions, to the debt from the buyer of the goods and to the proceeds 49 of the
goods (or the value of the proceeds), if received by the borrower within
ten days of receivership or bankruptcy.
These provisions grant preferred claims to the lender under the trust
receipt. He does not have to trace or identify proceeds. The principles of
following trust funds, applied in the law of trusts,50 are ignored. The stat-
ute is extremely liberal to the lender under the trust receipt in his contest
with the general creditors of the borrower.s'
VI. EFFECT OF STATUTE ON PLEDGE LAW
The Trust Receipts Act also covers some types of pledge transactions,
not on the theory that they may properly be called trust receipt dealings,
but on the notion that, although not trust receipt cases, they are so nearly
like the trust receipt device that they ought to be governed in the same
act and by similar rules.
A. Pledge without delivery
The act first covers the case of an attempted pledge without delivery
of the res to the pledgee. This transaction at common law would normally
48 A provision in the Uniform Act, § io(c) regarding waiver of a right to an accounting has
been omitted from the Illinois Act. § io(c).
49 In Hamilton National Bank v. McCallum, 58 F. (2d) 912 (C.C.A. 6th 1932) it was held
under Tennessee law that the holder of the trust receipt was the owner of the proceeds of goods
sold by a bankrupt lender, as against his trustee in bankruptcy.
so See Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §§ 921-930 (X935).
s' Illinois Act, § 30, making misappropriation of the proceeds of goods by the borrower
a felony, is not found in the Uniform Act.
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be ineffective as a pledge because of the rule that possession in the pledgee
is a prerequisite to the perfection of a pledge transaction-52 The statute
provides that such an attempted pledge without transfer of possession
shall be valid in favor of a pledgee who gives new value, for ten days,
against the pledgor's creditors; but invalid in favor of such a pledgee,
after ten days, against lien creditors of the pledgor without notice. Such
a so-called pledge is also invalid when in favor of a pledgee who took the
pledge for an old debt and did not give new value, as against lien creditors
without notice; and also invalid against bona fide purchasers from the
pledgee. This gives, therefore, a very limited vitality to a pledge without
any transfer of possession to the pledgee.
B. Redelivery of pledge to pledgor for temporary use
The act, secondly, covers the case of a pledge where the pledgee original-
ly got possession and so the pledge had no defect, but later the pledgee
delivered the goods back to the pledgor. Normally at common law it is
held that such redelivery "for a temporary purpose" does not destroy the
pledgee's rights against the pledgor or his creditors but does subordinate
him to a bona fide purchaser under the pledgor in possession ) The act in
substance defines "temporary" to mean not more than ten days. It main-
tains the validity of the pledge if the redelivery is for a temporary and
limited purpose, for a period of ten days, as against all creditors of the
pledgor.
These provisions about pledges are, however, possibly qualified by the
terms of Section 15,54 to the effect that the
Act shall not apply to single transactions of legal or equitable pledge, not constituting
a course of business, whether such transactions be unaccompanied by delivery of pos-
s' Corbett v. Underwood, 83 lL 324 (1876); Atkinson v. Foster, 134 I2. 472, 25 N.E. 528
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Rice & Bullen Malting Co. v. International Bank, 185 Ill. 422, 56 N.E. 1o62 (xgoo) (to sell
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sales contract delivered to pledgor to get another contract); Hollister v. Dinsmore, z91 Ill.
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also Schumann v. Bank of California National Association, 114 Ore. 336, 233 Pac. 86o (1925)
(redelivery destroys pledgee's rights against bonafide purchaser from pledgor in possession).
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session, or involved constructive delivery, or delivery and redelivery, actual or construc-
tive, so far as such transactions involve only an entruster who is an individual natural
person, and a trustee entrusted as a fiduciary with handling investments or finances
of the entruster.
VI. SUMMARY AS TO EFFECT OF ACT
A. It makes clear the meaning of the trust receipt transaction and con-
siderably broadens the scope it had acquired in the earlier case law.
B. It establishes the fact that the trust receipt transaction is an inde-
pendent, separate type of security transaction, and not merely one type
of chattel mortgage or conditional sale.
C. It liberalizes the law of pledges in the direction of enabling the
pledgee to get and keep his interest, notwithstanding short periods of lack
of possession.
D. It provides for public notice of the existence of trust receipt rela-
tions between two parties, thus giving the credit-lending class some op-
portunity to guard against deceptive appearances produced by trust re-
ceipts where there has been possession by the borrower for more than
thirty days.
E. It contains very liberal terms in favor of the lender as to the enforce-
ment of his rights under the receipt, providing for an optional foreclosure
sale on simple, short notice, and giving the lender important preferred
creditor rights against an insolvent borrower.
F. In general the theory of the act is to give to the bank, finance com-
pany, or other lender every conceivable protection in handling trust re-
ceipt and pledge transactions, so that the use of these security devices may
be increased and the financing of sales and other transactions facilitated.
